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A CLAIM FOR THIRD PARTY STANDING IN
MALPRACTICE CASES INVOLVING REPRESSED MEMORY
SYNDROME
In May 1994, a California jury awarded $500,000 to Gary
Ramona, whose twenty-three-year-old daughter Holly had ac-
cused hn of sexually molesting her as a child.1 Holly testified
that from the time that she was five years old until she reached
the age of eight, her father raped her repeatedly 2 She based her
allegations solely on memories recovered during recent therapy
for bulimia.3 Pretrial discovery revealed that Holly had not re-
membered any incidents of childhood sexual abuse until her
therapist suggested that past abuse had caused her bulimia.4
After attending group therapy, she experienced flashbacks.'
Later, her therapists injected her with sodium amytal, common-
ly known as truth serum, and, while sedated, Holly accused her
father of raping her when she was a child.' Her therapists as-
sured her that fabricating stones under sedation was impossible
and actively encouraged her to confront her father.7
Mr. Ramona adamantly denied the accusations, but, as a
result of the allegations, his wife divorced him, his family disin-
tegrated, and his career collapsed.8 Mr. Ramona claimed that
Holly's therapists were responsible for the injuries to his reputa-
tion and his family because they had planted false memories in
Holly's mind,9 and he sued them for malpractice. ° Courts gen-
1. Ramona v. Isabella, No. 61898 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 1994); see Mark Han-
sen, More False Memory Suits Likely, A.BA. J., Aug. 1994, at 36, 36.
2. Julie Tamakl, Abuse Case To Challenge New Law on Limitations, L.A. TIMES,
May 15, 1994, at B1.
3. Id.
4. Elizabeth F Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories Shattered Lwes,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 70, 71-72.
5. Id. at 72.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Tamal, supra note 2, at 31.
9. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 4, at 72.
10. Hansen, supra note 1, at 36.
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erally find that third parties lack standing to bring malpractice
suits against health care providers. In an unprecedented deci-
sion, however, a California jury apparently decided that the
defendants had breached a duty of care to Mr. Ramona when
they treated Holly and encouraged her belief m the validity of
her recovered memories.11
Mr. Ramona is not alone m confronting accusations of child
sexual abuse based on "false memories."1 In the 1980s, a new
legal phenomena developed-civil suits alleging child sexual
abuse on the basis of "memories" recovered during psychothera-
py 13 Only in recent years has child sexual abuse'4 received
ii. Ramona v. Isabella, No. 61898 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 1994). Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Burton Bach later dismissed Holly Ramona's civil case against
her father, holding that the outcome of her father's malpractice suit had resolved
the issue of whether any abuse took place. Sex Abuse Suit Dismissed in False-Memo-
ry Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1994, at A26.
12. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 4, at 72. Holly exhibited all of the symptoms
of "false memory syndrome." The term "false memory syndrome" describes the phe-
nomenon in which a mental therapy patient "remembers" an event, such as child-
hood sexual abuse, that never occurred. HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH UNDERWAGER,
RETURN OF THE FURIES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO RECOVERED MEMORY THERAPY 96-97
(1994). The syndrome involves more than the mere maccurate recall of an event.
FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME FOUND., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (Draft Pam-
phlet 1994) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS]. Instead, an untrue memory
becomes so deeply ingrained in the patient's mind that it affects her personality and
lifestyle and, in turn, disrupts all other aspects of her behavior. Id.
13. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 4, at 71; see, e.g., Boggs v. Adams, 45 F.3d
1056 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing the district court's dismissal of a 1991 complaint
alleging that the defendant sexually abused the plaintiff from 1959-1965, but that
the plaintiff did not remember the abuse until 1989); Carlson v. Rice, 832 F Supp.
17 (D. Me. 1993) (refusing parents' motion to dismiss daughter's clanm alleging that,
in 1991, she had remembered incidents of sexual abuse that took place in the early
1970s); Hoult v Hoult, 792 F Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1992) (denying a father's motion
for summary judgment in a suit brought by ins daughter in 1988 alleging that, until
1985, she had repressed memories of sexual abuse that occurred from 1965 to 1974);
Mary D. v John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing the trial
court's dismissal of a suit filed in 1986 alleging that in 1985 the plaintiff had recov-
ered memories of her father sexually abusing her in the 1960s), review dismissed,
800 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1990); D.P v. M.J.O., 640 N.E.2d 1323 (Mll. App. Ct. 1994) (re-
versing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' 1991 claim that alleged that they
had suppressed memories of sexual abuse by their fathers dunng the 1970s and
1980s); Vesecky v. Vesecky, 880 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing the trial
court's directed verdict for the defendant in a daughter's 1991 suit against her fa-
ther for sexual abuse suffered from 1973 to 1988 and remembered in 1990). The
largest jury award to date is $5 million punitive damages and $150,000 compensato-
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much attention. 5 As the public began to realize the prevalence
of such behavior, 6 heightened awareness led to the increased
use of a dubious trend in psychotherapyl'--the reliance on re-
covered memory theory to uncover memories of past abuse.'"
Therapists who subscribe to recovered memory theory point to a
wide variety of common problems, ranging from eating disorders
to sleeplessness, as evidence of repressed memories of sexual
abuse. 9 The therapists purposely direct their treatment toward
awakening these "dormant" memories to aid the patient in com-
ing to terms with the "truth" about her past.2'
ry damages to a woman who filed suit against her uncle for sexual abuse during the
1960s and early 1970s that she repressed until 1989. Herald v. Hood, CA. No.
15986, 1993 Ono App. LEXIS 3688 (Ono Ct. App. July 21, 1993), cert. denied, 131
L. Ed. 2d 219 (1995). The trial court, however, reduced the punitive damage award
to $2.5 million. Id. at *2.
14. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect has defined child sexual
abuse as "contacts or interactions between a child and an adult when the child is
being used as an object of gratification for the adult sexual needs or desires.' An-
drew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typzcal Characteris-
tics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. L.J. 429 n.1 (1985) (quoting HHS, SEXUAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 1 (1980)).
15. Brian D. Gallagher, Note, Damages, Duress, and the Discovery Rule: The
Statutory Right of Recovery for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 17 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 505, 505-06 (1993).
16. In 1979, David Finkelhor published an often cited study m which he found
that, among 796 college students, 19.2% of the women and 8.6% of the men con-
fessed to an incident of sexual molestation in their childhood. DAVID FINKELHOR,
SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 42, 53 (1979). Another study, conducted by Diana
Russell, found that, among 930 women surveyed, 31% had experienced at least one
incident of sexual abuse by a nonrelative prior to age eighteen. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL,
THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 61 (1986). Some
authors have attributed the current media fascination with child sexual abuse to its
shocking nature. See, e.g., .Gallagher, supra note 15, at 506.
17. This Note will use the term "psychotherapy" to apply to any form of psychoan-
alytic therapy, whether conducted by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or otherwise desig-
nated therapist.
18. Recovered memory therapists now advertise widely in magazines and telephone
books and hold yearly conferences to exchange findings. RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN
WATTERS, MAEING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SEXUAL HYSTE-
RIA 3 (1994).
19. ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY
152-56 (1994); see, e.g., Farns v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994). In Farris, the
plaintiffs provided a laundry list of injuries indicative of repressed memories, includ-
ing "employment impairment, depression, low self-esteem and confidence, suicidal
ideation [and] inability to function normally in social situations" Id. at 56 n.8.
20. LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 152-56. Insurance compames have paid
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Advocates of recovered memory theory believe that confront-
ing the alleged abuser is a necessary part of the patient's heal-
ing.2 Confrontation often takes the form of a lawsuit.' In re-
cent years, the number of civil cases based on recovered memo-
ries of childhood sexual abuse has skyrocketed,' even as courts
undertake the difficult task of determining the validity of recov-
ered memories. Since its establishment m 1992, the False Mem-
ory Syndrome Foundation has received 14,000 reports of sexual
abuse accusations based on recovered memories.24 Of the indi-
viduals touched by these allegations, one in sixteen faces suit by
his or her own child.' Three quarters of the actions are civil,
and one quarter are crinmal."
Accusations of abuse based on "uncovered memories" trauma-
tize and damage innocent parents. A sexual abuser of children
is the worst sort of predator; one can hardly imagine a more
horrifying monster than the individual who steals a helpless
child's innocence. However, if the alleged abuser is innocent, he
millions of dollars to cover the costs of recovered memory therapy. OFSHE &
WATTERS, supra note 18, at 3.
21. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
22. Elizabeth F Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
518, 522 (1993).
23. Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual
Abuse: Lawsuits Against Parents, 10 BEHAVIORAL SC. & L. 483, 483 (1992); see also
Sharon Begley & Martha Brant, You Must Remember This, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26,
1994, at 68, 69 (stating that recovered memories of sexual abuse have formed the
basis of 700 civil and criminal cases).
24. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 4-7. A "group of profes-
sionals and affected families" established the foundation. Id. at 5. Respected psychia-
tnsts, psychologists, social workers, attorneys, and educators serve on its Scientific
and Professional Advisory Board. Id. at 2. The foundation's stated purpose is to
document the extent of false memory accusations, disseminate the latest scientific
information on memory, and help accused families. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. Civil suits are more prevalent because they do not require the heavy bur-
den of proof of criminal cases. Gallagher, supra note 15, at 524 n.118. In 1994, the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation was tracking more than 800 lawsuits. FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 8.
27. Gallagher, supra note 15, at 533. Commentators have analogized the sudden
increase in suits based on false memories to the Salem witch trials. Id., see, e.g.,
Melinda L. Moseley, Comment, Civil Contempt and Child Sexual Abuse Allegations:
A Modern Solomon's Choice?, 40 EMORY L.J. 203 (1991) (providing an overview of
the effect of allegations of sexual abuse in custody battles).
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cannot escape the negative social stigma of the accusation, and
its financial and emotional repercussions remamY Ramona is
the first successful malpractice case brought by a third party
against a repressed memory therapist in which the court found
the therapist who suggested the "memories" responsible for the
innocent party's ruined family, reputation, and careerY Only
one other third party malpractice case against a therapist has
evaded summary judgment. ° Ramona, therefore, raises the
question of whether future innocent parties may bring third
party malpractice cases against "recovered memory" therapists
for encouraging false memories of abuse.
This Note will present evidence casting doubt on the validity
of recovered memories. It will focus on the damage done to inno-
cent individuals who face accusations of sexual abuse based on
these "memories." The first section will examine the nature of
memory, in order to help understand why the theory of recov-
ered memories remains questionable. The second section will
discuss the memory enhancement techniques that therapists use
to recover memories, in order to show not only that their meth-
ods may create convincing memories of events that never hap-
pened, but also that the therapist acts negligently and irrespon-
sibly when he uses such suggestive methods. Section three will
examine the response to recovered memory cases. Finally, the
fourth section will suggest that, in light of the sudden and
alarming increase in the number of civil suits based on recov-
ered memories, courts should grant standing to innocent third
parties bringing malpractice suits against negligent therapists.
This Note will argue that malpractice suits by third parties
would serve as "quality control tools"3 in the field of psycho-
therapy, providing protection to both patients, who may still be
under the influence of the negligent therapist, and the innocent
third parties. The widespread and damaging effects of the false
28. See, e.g., Georgia Sargeant, Victims, Courts, Academics Debate Truth of Recov-
ered Memories in Abuse Cases, TRIAL, May 1994, at 13, 14.
29. Hansen, supra note 1, at 36.
30. See Sullivan.v. Cheshier, 846 F. Supp. 654 (NJ). Mll. 1994); znfra notes 168-84
and accompanying text. The trial court has not yet reached a final decision in
Sullivan.
31. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 4, at 73.
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memory allegations necessitate third party standing. If negligent
therapists continue to urge legal action against innocent third
parties, the courts, clogged with lawsuits against the innocent,
will be unable to devote adequate attention to real victims and
their abusers."
THE NATURE OF MEMORY
Experts have described recovered memory theory as "'either
the most fascinating psychological discovery of the 20th century
or the centerpiece of the most embarrassing mistake modern
psychiatry and psychotherapy have ever made."'33 Recovered
memory theorists believe that individuals repress memories of
traumatic events deep in the psyche. According to theorists, this
repression occurs when a person consciously tries to forget the
event and "eventually the mental grooves become so deep that
no psychic energy is required to keep the conscious mind entire-
ly and automatically away "34 The therapist works on the as-
sumption that patients can accurately remember repressed
memories with the help of psychotherapy
One must understand the nature of memory in order to un-
derstand why recovered memories form a questionable basis for
a lawsuit. Mental health professionals have loosely defined
memory as a type of repository in which facts and information
may be retained in the brain over some period of tune.35 Memo-
ry is, however, imperfect.36 It does not act like a video recorder
systematically storing lifetime events.37 Not only do individuals
often see things inaccurately in the first place, but, even if they
32. As the number of false memory cases increases, society may begin to doubt
the claims of real victims of abuse. Loftus, supra note 22, at 534.
33. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 4, at 71 (quoting Richard Ofshe and Margaret
Singer, two of the most outspoken academic critics of recovered memory theory). If
repressed memories do exist, the question arises why the present generation is the
first generation to notice that people can repress all memory of trauma when hu-
mankind has endured such horrors throughout time. OFsHE & WATTERS, supra note
18, at 36.
34. Lisa Davis, Murdered Memory, HEALTH, May 1991, at 78.
35. GEOFFREY LOFTUS & ELIZABETH LOFrUS, HUMAN MEMORY 1 (1976).
36. ELIZABETH LOFTUS, MEMORY 37 (1980).
37. Id., see also JACK A. ADAMS, HUMAN MEMORY 29 (1967) (stating that "the hy-
pothesis of permanent memory has not received serious research attention").
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view events accurately, they may not necessarily store the mem-
ory perfectly 3 ' Time and interfering experiences make memo-
nes malleable and fallible.39
Although the accounts of recovered memories of childhood
sexual abuse are compelling, little scientific evidence supports
the theory that complete repression of memory can occur.4" For
instance, in 1974, David S. Holmes published a study in which
he concluded that no reliable evidence for repression exists.41 In
1990, Holmes stated that he had not found any new research to
change his mind." He noted that despite over sixty years of re-
search involving numerous approaches by many investigators,
no controlled laboratory evidence supports the concept of com-
plete repression.43
Scientific research demonstrating that individuals usually
remember traumatic experiences undermines the notion of re-
pression. In studies of children who experienced traumatic
events, researchers found that some children distorted the mem-
ory, but none forgot.44 Of the twenty-six children kidnapped
and buried alive in Chowchilla, Calffornia, in 1976, all remem-
bered the traumatic event years later.45 When mdividuals fail
38. LOFTUS, supra note 36, at 37.
39. Id. An additional biological factor may explain the source of false memories.
Most people are able to distinguish memories of events from memories of dreams
through the working of the brain's frontal lobes. Begley & Brant, supra note 23, at
68. Damage to the frontal lobes renders a person unable to distinguish where a
memory originated, thus bits of memories of dreams may become interspersed with a
real memory. Id.
40. Tracy Thompson, Delayed Lawsuits of Sexual Abuse on the Rise, WASH. POST,
Aug. 14, 1991, at Bi; see also Julie S. Silberg, Comment, Memory Repression:
Should It Toll the Statutory Limitations Period in Child Sexual Abuse Cases?, 39
WAYNE L. REV. 1589, 1597 (1993) (noting "a lack of scientific studies on repressed
memories").
41. David S. Holmes, The Evidence for Repression: An Examination of Sixty Years
of Research, in REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY THEO-
RY, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND HEALTH 85, 85 (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 99.
44. Wakefield & Underwager, supra note 23, at 495; see also WENDY KAMINER, rM
DYSFUNCTIONAL, YOU'RE DYSFUNCTIONAL. THE RECOVERY MOVEMENT AND OTHER
SELF-HELP FASHIONS 81-85 (1992) (relating the stones of Cambodian women who
vividy remembered soldiers of the Khmer Rouge viciously raping them and murder-
ing their husbands).
45. OFSHE & WAITERS, supra note 18, at 265.
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to store a memory, the failure usually involves an incident that
happened only once and is not repeated. 6 The trauma of the
event does not merely suppress the memory, but prevents the
memory from ever being stored. The individual therefore has
nothing to retrieve at a later date.47
The fact that memory functions differently in children than in
adults is further reason to question recovered memories of child-
hood sexual abuse. Data on infant amnesia demonstrates that it
is highly unlikely that individuals will accurately recall events
reported to have occurred before the age of three or four.48
Studies indicate that events that individuals remember may be
a blend of memory and fantasy For example, an analysis of 133
school children attending school when a sniper fired shots onto
the school playground showed substantial changes in their mem-
ories within a short time.49 Children who were not even outside
at the time vividly remembered standing close to the playground
when their schoolmates were injured." Such studies do not
suggest that all childhood memories later remembered are false
and unreliable, but they do suggest that therapists and courts
should not necessarily take these memories at face value and
should require corroborative evidence.
One famous example of a false "recovered" memory involves
Jean Piaget, the father of developmental psychology Piaget
remembered in rich detail a man attempting to kidnap him
when he was a child.5 He recalled seeing his nurse fight brave-
46. Wakefield & Underwager, supra note 23, at 493.
47. LOFTUS, supra note 36, at 82. High anxiety hinders memory because it causes
individuals to ignore visual cues in their environment. Id.
48. Wakefield & Underwager, supra note 23, at 501; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LEARNING AND MEMORY 26-29 (Larry R. Squire ed., 1992) (stating that adults do not
recall specific events that occurred before the age of two). Nevertheless, numerous
recovered memory patients allege memories of abuse that occurred when they were
infants. See, e.g., Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that the plaintiff claimed that sexual abuse occurred from infancy through
age five), review dismissed, 800 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1990). In data collected by the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation, 26% of repressed memory patients remembered abuse
prior to age two, 50% remembered abuse prior to age four, and 66% remembered
abuse prior to age six. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 7
49. OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 18, at 41.
5o. Id.
51. LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 76.
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ly with the man and even recalled the scratches that she re-
ceived on her face.52 When Piaget was fifteen, his former nurse
wrote to his parents to confess that she had fabricated the entire
story ' Piaget then realized that a memory, seemingly clearly
remembered, may be untrue. He theorized that he must have
heard the account and "projected [it] into the past in the form of
a visual memory ,
The memory does not act as a bank vault, storing all past
experiences in accurate detail. Recovered memories depend on
the initial storage process and on the cues used to aid recall.55
The "cues" used by the therapist provide an explanation for the
origin of false memories.
SUGGESTIVE THERAPY TECHNIQUES USED To UNCOVER
REPRESSED MEMORIES
An examination of the psychoanalytic techniques used to re-
construct memories supports the argument that the origin of
many memories is in the therapist's and not the patient's mind.
Use of the suggestive techniques may be evidence of a
therapist's unethical behavior.56 For example, in Mateu v.
Hagen,57 a Washington court accepted the defendant's argu-
ment that unconventional therapy techniques could have shaped
the plaintiffs memories.' The use of unconventional tech-
niques was also the basis of an action brought by three patients
in Missouri, who sued a climc for the negligent supervision of a
therapist who inaccurately persuaded them that they had been
molested.59
52. Id.
53. Id. at 76-77.
54. Id. at 77.
55. LOFTUS, supra note 36, at 100.
56. WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 12, at 230. In 1994, the Minnesota
Board of Medical Practice suspended a psychiatrist's license for encouraging her
patients to remember false memories. Id. The Board received numerous complaints
from former patients, who stated that her practice resembled a cult. Id.
57. Mateu v. Hagen, No. 91-2-08053-4 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 9, 1993).
58. Sargeant, supra note 28, at 13 (citing Mateu v. Hagen, No. 91-2-08053-4
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 9, 1993) (referring to the use of psychodrama, hypnosis, and
age regression)).
59. Id. at 14 (citing two unreported cases, Jester v. Matrix, No. CV89-029236 (Mo.
19951 345
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Therapists themselves disagree about the validity of recovered
memories.6" Some claim that an individual not trained and edu-
cated in psychopathology could not possibly simulate a disorder
successfully 6 The most damning criticism of recovered memo-
rles, however, comes from within the medical community In the
summer of 1993, the American Medical Association (AMA)
passed a resolution warning of the dangers of misapplying mem-
ory enhancement techniques used by therapists.62 In June
1994, the AMA agreed with the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion that "there is no completely accurate way of determining
the validity of reports [based on recovered memories] in the
absence of corroborating information."5  Nevertheless, few
courts have denied the existence of recovered memories,'
though courts have recognized that psychiatry and psychology
are not exact sciences.65
The Initial Consultation. A Preordained Diagnosis
Repressed memory patients initially consult a therapist for a
wide variety of common problems, including eating disorders
and depression.66 Confronted with a patient who reveals no ap-
Cir. Ct. filed Nov 17, 1989); Staggs v. Matrix, No. CV86-20779 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed
Aug. 22, 1986)).
60. Thompson, supra note 40, at B1.
61. 1 JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 430
(3d ed. 1981).
62. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 6.
63. Id. (emphasis omitted).
64. Gallagher, supra note 15, at 532. But see Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 874-
75 (Ohio 1994) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) ("There probably will be a day when
courts can be given reliable, competent information on the issue of repressed memo-
ry. That day is not here.").
65. Lmdabury v. Lmdabury, 552. So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Nesbitt v. Community Health, 467 So. 2d 711, 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (Jorgenson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (upholding a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant with even the dissent recognizing that the psychi-
atric profession represents the "penultimate gray area'"), affd, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1990); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (holding that, even in
civil commitment proceedings, "[tihe subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis
render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations").
66. LOFTUs & KETCHUM, supra note 19, at 20; see also Aaron H. Esman, "Sexual
Abuse," Pathogenests, and Enlightened Skeptictsm, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1101, 1101
(1994) (stating that childhood sexual abuse is increasingly invoked as the cause of a
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parent reason for her troubles, the therapist who subscribes to
repressed memory theory will conclude that the patient must be
suffering from the aftermath of repressed sexual abuse.67 The
Courage To Heal, commonly prescribed reading for both thera-
pists and victims of repressed memory, 8 advises therapists to
recogmze the symptoms of early sexual abuse: "If sexual abuse
isn't the presenting [sic] problem but your client has eating dis-
orders, an addiction to drugs or alcohol, sicidal feelings, or
sexual problems, these may be symptoms of sexual abuse."69
Advocates assert that the symptoms of repressed memories
include a startling array of common problems, but evidence
gathered in recent studies directly contradicts the link between
eating disorders and repressed memories. One study of women
who had a lifetime history of eating disorders revealed that
women with bulimia were no more likely than women in other
patient groups to have suffered sexual abuse as children.7" An-
other study of 202 women found that childhood sexual abuse
was "neither necessary nor sufficient for the later development
wide range of disorders, especially in women).
67. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, At 28, Kathy O'Connor of Arlington Says She
Remembered That Her Father Raped Her, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1994, at 12 (telling
the story of a woman who, after therapy, decided that the "primary cause of her
failed l-month marrage, her drnkng and drug use, the chronic nightmares and
panic attacks and, especially, of the simmering rage that imperiled jobs and relation-
ships" was her repressed memories of abuse); see also WILLIAM PINCUS, THE PROB-
LEM OF GAUGIN'S THERAPIST: LANGUAGE, MADNESS AND THERAPY 49-50 (1994) (dis-
cussmg how therapists conclude that a patient suffered abuse when there is no
apparent reason for the patient's health problems).
68. LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 20-21; Wakefield & Underwager, supra
note 22, at 484-85; see also PINCUS, supra note 67, at 60 (stating that therapists
"frequently recommend that new patients read books which may perpetuate the ad-
vertising trick of creating illness through horoscopic suggestion").
69. ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE To HEAL 349 (1988). The authors
admit in the preface that they have received criticism for their lack of acadenc
credentials. Id. at 14.
70. Marcia Rorty et al., Childhood Sexual, Physical, and Psychological Abuse in
Bulimia Nervosa, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1122, 1122 (1994). One hundred twenty
women participated in the study, 40 of whom had been recovering from an eating
disorder for a year, 40 of whom were currently suffering from an eating disorder,
and 40 of whom had never had an eating disorder. Id. The researchers favored plac-
ing eating disorders "in the context of a more comprehensive, multidimensional risk
factor model" rather than simply viewing them in an "if child abuse, then eating
disorder" model. Id. at 1126.
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of an eating disorder."71
The most compelling evidence that memories may be suggest-
ed by the therapist is the composite profile of the type of patient
who discovers repressed memories. The similarity in social and
educational background appears to be indicative of a precon-
ceived diagnosis. Recovered memory patients tend to be fe-
males72 between the ages of thirty-one and fifty "3 A large per-
centage, thirty-one percent, have pursued education beyond col-
lege.74 The profiles of the accused are also striking similar. Al-
most seventy-five percent of the accused parents have never
been divorced, twenty-two percent are in their seventies or
eighties, and eighteen percent have been accused of participat-
ing in satanic rituals.75 Seventy-one percent of the patients'
siblings do not believe the accusations."6 In sum, a typical re-
pressed memory patient is a young to middle-aged, well-educat-
ed woman from an affluent family whose siblings have not re-
ported similar abuse.7"
The Techniques Used To Uncover Memories
After deciding that the patient's symptoms, whether they be
sleeplessness, depression, or alcoholism, are clear signs of prior
sexual abuse,"8 the therapist uses a number of techniques to
71. Johann Kinzel et al., Family Background and Sexual Abuse Assoctated with
Eating Disorders, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1127, 1130 (1994).
72. Ninety-two percent are female. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12,
at 7 The False Memory Syndrome Foundation collects in-depth demographic infor-
mation from affected families. Id.
73. Seventy-four percent of patients fall within the 31-50 age group. Id. Sixty-four
percent of patients claim to have repressed memories for 20-39 years. Id.
74. Id. One therapist noted that in a family of eight repressed memory patients,
all were professionals with advanced degrees. WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, THE MERRY-
GO-ROUND OF SEXUAL ABUSE 54 (1993).
75. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 7 Sixty-two percent accuse
their father of abusing them and their mothers of being in denial. Id. Thirty percent
accuse both the mother and father of active abuse. Id. Sixteen percent of those ac-
cused of sexual abuse "have been threatened with or are involved in legal action."
Id.
76. Id.
77. But see Farris v Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 52-53 (D.C. 1994) (involving two
sisters who remembered an older brother abusing them, but recalled the abuse only
after each had consulted a therapist).
78. See generally LAURENCE R. TANCREDI & ANDREW E. SLABY, ETHICAL POLICY IN
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"uncover" the memories. 9 One of the most controversial tech-
niques is the use of hypnosis. Hypnosis is defined as "a tempo-
rary condition of altered attention in the subject." ° Skepticism
about the validity of statements made by a hypnotized person
has existed as long as the technique.8' In 1958, the AMA
warned that hypnosis poses the risk of alternating consciousness
and memory, as well as increasing susceptibility to
suggestion. 2 The AMA reiterated the warning in 1985, stating,
"at best hypnosis may aid in the production of memories, but
these memories will not necessarily be accurate." 's
Critics have identified several characteristics of the hypnotic
state as possible reasons for the creation of pseudomemones,
including: "an increased state of suggestibility , a possible
desire to please the hypnotist , the possibility that the sub-
ject will fill in gaps in his actual recollection with fantasy
and the subject's heightened certitude about the accuracy of his
recollections."' The danger is that a previously hypnotized pa-
tient will lose her sense of critical judgment about the memory,
instead believing that the memory discovered by hypnosis is
true.' Hence, cross-examination of the patient may be futile
and counterproductive." Although courts have long recognized
MENTAL HEALTH CARE: THE GOALS OF PSYCHIATRIC INTERVENTION 133-34 (1977)
(explaining that the classes of mental conditions that are most susceptible to a sub-
jective diagnosis are neuroses, "because a pathology has been essentially eked out of
the patient's history, and [tihe objectivity of the diagnosis rests on reconstruct-
mg a history that 'suggests' a disease process"); Walter Reich, Psychiatric Diagnosis
as an Ethical Problem, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 61, 81 (Sidney Bloch & Paul Chodoff
eds., 1981) (stating that a diagnosis is often a self-confirming hypothesis).
79. Just as dozens of personality theories and hundreds of approaches to psycho-
therapy exist, so too do numerous techniques used to uncover memories. See David
Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, SCIENCE, July
1, 1988, at 31, 33.
80. John L. Plotkm, The Previously Hypnotized Witness: Is His Testimony Admissi-
ble?, 106 ML. L. REV. 163, 170 (1984) (quoting Council on Mental Health, Medical
Use of Hypnosis, 168 JAMA 186 (1958)).
81. See ROBERT A. BAKER, THEY CALL IT HYPNOSIS 53-87 (1990) (giving a brief
biographical sketch of the "father" of hypnosis, Franz Anton Mesmer).
82. ALAN W. SCHEFLIN & JERROLD L. SHAPIRO, TRANCE ON TRIAL 108-09 (1989).
83. Id. at 109.
84. Plotkn, supra note 80, at 173.
85. Id. at 173-74.
86. Id. at 174; see also Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 132, 139 (Alaska 1986)
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the dangers of hypnosis, the Supreme Court, mn Rock v. Arkan-
sas,87 held that a state may not have a per se rule excluding
hypnotic evidence at trial.' Even the Court in Rock recognized
that the "most common response to hypnosis, however, appears
to be an increase in both correct and incorrect recollections." 9
Group therapy is another often utilized treatment.90 The in-
herent problem in group therapy is the tendency to go along
with the crowd.9' Patients searching for answers to similar
problems9" and the dynamics of the group foster the belief m
"memories" of abuse as the group continuously encourages indi-
vidual patients to let go of their denial.9 As one might ex-
pect, after one patient reveals a buried memory, others in the
group "suddenly" remember their own memories of abuse.94
Patients are warned that "outsiders" will question the memo-
ries, and the group becomes a safe haven, a place of comfort
and acceptance.95
Other therapy techniques are equally suggestive, including
dream interpretation, massage, sodium amytal therapy, and
(stating that hypnosis adds to a witness's confidence and alters her demeanor). See
generally SCHEFLIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 108-09 (stating that hypnosis is a
two-edged sword that is potentially useful in uncovering memories but also potential-
ly dangerous in creating them).
87. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
88. Id. at 61-62 (stating that courts can verify hypnotically refreshed testimony by
corroborating evidence and other means of assessing accuracy). However, Rock ad-
dressed only the use of hypnotic evidence by a criminal defendant. Id. at 45.
89. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
90. BASS & DAVIS, supra note 69, at 462.
91. See OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 18, at 116. See generally HuMiAN SUGGEST-
IBILITY (John F Schumaker ed., 1991) (providing a general discussion of suggestive
communication).
92. LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 23. The authors note that simply be-
longing to a therapy group tends to "speed up" the recovery of memories as patients
verify and validate their feelings with each other. Id.
93. See zd. at 24.
94. See IRVIN D. YALOM, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY
(1970) (discussing group therapy). The author lists curative factors of group therapy,
including universality, imitative behavior, and group cohesiveness. Id. at 5. After one
such group session, a woman turned to other members of her support group and
asked, "Do you think I really could have been abused? Maybe I was just acting."
BASS & DAVIS, supra note 69, at 87. Another group member assured her that no
one could act out an experience as vividly as she had unless it were true. Id.
95. BASS & DAVIS, supra note 69, at 87
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"visualization."' In a procedure called "trance work," a thera-
pist tells the patient to "shut her eyes, [to] imagine what might
have happened back m her past, and then [to] write down in her
journal 'whatever pops into your head."'' One author and ther-
apist advises that if the "survivor" is resistant, the therapist
must more strongly direct the guided imagery9 The therapist
might use a prepared story that closely resembles the alleged
abuse incidents, in order to help her "remember."'9 When the
"survivor" experiences confusing and conflicting emotions, the
therapist should reassure her that the feelings are normal, and
that the "survivor" should "just let them happen."'00 Total de-
pendency on the therapist is fostered by a technique called
"reparenting," in which therapists encourage "regressed" adults
to suck baby bottles and wear diapers.'0 ' Memories are "recov-
ered" by putting the patients "in an infant state of mind and
mak[ing] them believe they are experiencing earlier events."' 2
The danger in all of these techniques is that the therapist
validates the "memories" by encouraging their creation and
rewarding the patient with positive feedback when she "remem-
bers" anything.0 3 The False Memory Syndrome Foundation
discovered that among 300 women who "remembered" memories,
only to later retract them, many said that they were told that
any discovered memory must be true.0 4 Therapists never told
the women that their memories could be wrong.'
"'The therapist's responsibility is to uncover emotions and
help the patient see them." 0 Although this goal is laudable,
96. See Sargeant, supra note 28, at 12. The author describes the memories as
being "midwifed" by the techniques. Id.
97. LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 24 (emphasis added).
98. PRENDERGAST, supra note 74, at 143.
99. Id. at 142.
100. Id.
101. Sargeant, supra note 28, at 14.
102. Id. at 12.
103. See LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 24. One patient stated that the
therapist would read journal entries aloud and remark, "This is real,' These
events really happened.'" Id.
104. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 10.
105. Id.
106. Sullivan v. Cheshier, 846 F. Supp. 654, 657 (ND. l. 1994) (quoting defendant
therapist's statement concerning the goals of therapy).
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the underlying assumption, that "no one fantasizes abuse,""7
is incorrect and unsupported by science. With the use of the
aforementioned techniques, the therapist, ignoring even the
patient's own denial of abuse, "implants" the memories through
repeated suggestions and questions. Critics have documented
direct evidence of the suggestiveness of the various techniques
from therapists' own accounts, patients' statements, and video-
taped sessions.' Additional evidence lies in the recommenda-
tion provided by the authors of The Courage To Heal. Bass and
Davis advise therapists that if a patient "says she wasn't abused
but you suspect that she was, ask again later. Children often
repress memories of sexual abuse, and your questions may be
the trigger that reveals those memories, either now or later.""
According to the authors, the therapist must persist in the ques-
tioning: "Be creative. If the survivor can't say she was abused in
words, be innovative and patient."110 Constant badgering by
the therapist seems to be the key to "unlocking" the memo-
res."' Instead of "recovering" memories, the therapist commu-
nicates her own conclusions about the true origin of the patient's
problems to the patient through the repeated use of suggestive
questionng." '2 Happy memories of childhood are reinterpreted
as fronts that cover up years of abuse by parents who conspire
to portray their family as healthy and normal."'
107 BASS & DAVIS, supra note 69, at 347.
108. See Loftus, supra note 22, at 526-30 (discussing direct evidence of suggestive-
ness of therapy techniques).
109. BASS & DAVIS, supra note 69, at 350 (emphasis omitted).
110. Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted).
ill. Bass and Davis advise therapists that "[y]our client needs you to stay steady
in the belief that she was abused. Joining a client in doubt would be like joining a
suicidal client in her belief that suicide is the best way out." Id. at 347.
112. See, e.g., LorEus & KETCHAM, supra note 19, at 25 (quoting a therapy patient,
who stated, "My therapists encouraged and pushed me to "remember" more and
more, even though I was starting to show signs of psychosis during the treatment
sessions').
113. OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 18, at 6-7
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THE COURTS' AND STATES' RESPONSES TO REPRESSED MEMORY
CASES
The Initial Reaction
Many repressed memory cases are brought to court because
the therapist urged the patient to sue the abuser as a step to-
wards recovery " According to Bass and Davis, "[t]hey get
strong by suing. They step out of the fantasy that it didn't really
happen or that their parents really loved and cared for them in
a healthy way "'1
15
Courts have recognized the possibility that repressed memo-
res exist and may be recovered years later by therapy 116 For
example, in Archibald v. Archibald,"7 a woman sued her fa-
ther for assault and battery, incestuous abuse, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, breach of the parental duty, and inva-
sion of privacy, among other claims."' Although the plaintiff
was allegedly abused for seven years, from 1965 to 1972, she re-
pressed her memories for almost twenty years because she had
developed "severe psychological mechanisms, including deni-
al, repression, accommodation, and dissociation by which she
114. BASS & DAVIS, supra note 69, at i28. The authors state that "[tlhere are non-
violent means of retribution you can seek, Suing your abuser or turning him m to
the authorities are just two of the avenues open." Id.
115. Id. at 310 (quoting attorney Mary Williams). Litigation is viewed as a source
of empowerment. Id. Bass and Davis include a list of lawyers who are willing to
take on repressed memory cases. Id. at 311. The authors even suggest that patients
try to recover monetary damages from their parents' homeowners' or car insurance
policy. Id. at 309 (quoting attorney Mary Williams). A standard homeowner's policy
may provide for damages that a homeowner may cause by his own negligence, but it
does not provide for mjures intentionally inflicted by the insured. The suggestion
that sexual abuse may be characterized as unintentional seems ridiculous, but plain-
tiffs have nevertheless tried to get around the exclusion by arguing that, although
the insured intentionally engaged m abuse, he did not intend to inflict harm. Janet
K. Colaner & Delinda R. Johnson, Coverage for Parents' Sexual Abuse, FOR DEF.,
Mar. 1992, at 2, 4. Courts have not accepted the idea. See, e.g., State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Smith, 907 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that one cannot
intend an act of sexual molestation without intending harm); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Watters, 644 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (agreeing with the
"majority view" that specific intent to harm would be inferred as a matter of law).
116. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
117. 826 F Supp. 26 (D. Me. 1993).
118. Id. at 27.
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separated herself from the acts being done to her body "'119 The
fact that she had maintained a seemingly loving relationship
with her father over the years supposedly caused her to repress
her memories further. 2 °
At one tne, parental immunity prohibited children from
bringing personal injury lawsuits against a parent.'2' The pol-
icy considerations given to justify the immunity included the
preservation of domestic harmony, the necessity of parental
discipline and control, the danger of fraud and collusion, and
the possibility of the depletion of family resources.1" Most
states have abrogated the doctrine, however, or have carved
out exceptions to the total bar." For example, although Tex-
as has retained the parental immunity doctrine, children may
sue their parents for "wilful, malicious, wanton, or intentional
wrongdoing.'"' 4
The recent increase in the number of repressed memory civil
cases has resulted from changes in the statutes of limitations
that enlarge the time period in which a plamtiff may bring such
a suit.' 5 For most civil suits, the statutory limitations period
is one to three years after the cause of action accrues, and the
date of accrual is generally the date on which the mjury hap-
pens. 26 Statutes provide for tolling or suspension of the limita-
tions period under certain circumstances. If, for example, the
person mjured is a minor, the statute may be tolled until the
119. Id. at 27-28.
120. See id. at 28 (discussing the parties' relationship and the plaintiffs contention
that the close relationship was "intended" to "perpetuate her repression").
121. Colanen & Johnson, supra note 115, at 2.
122. Id., see, e.g., Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164, 165 (Ala. 1984) (listing the poli-
cy reasons for the doctnne before overruling it).
123. See Hill, 447 So. 2d at 165.
124. Colaneri & Johnson, supra note 116, at 3 (quoting Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270
S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (requiring more than "ordinary negligence"
and citing the lack of "wilful, malicious, wanton or intentional wrongdoing.")).
125. See Camille W. Cook & Pamela K. Millsaps, Redressing Wrongs of the Blame-
lessly Ignorant Survivor of Incest, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1991); Norie
Clevenger, Note, Statute of Limitations: Childhood Victims of Sexual Abuse Bringing
Civil Actions Against Their Perpetrators After Attaining the Age of Majority, 30 J.
FAM. L. 447, 453-55 (1991-1992); Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the
Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery
Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2190-91 (1991).
126. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 5:27 (1983).
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person reaches the age of eighteen, or if the victin is operating
under a disability, it may be tolled until the disability is re-
moved.' The discovery rule allows the tolling of the statutory
period until the injured party knows or reasonably should know
of the injury.'1
Until recently, rigid application of statutes of limitations pre-
vented adults with recovered memories from filing civil suts
twenty years after they were sexually abused, 9 and courts re-
fused to toll the statutes of limitations on account of repressed
memories. In the landmark case of Tyson v. Tyson,"' the Su-
preme Court of Washington first considered whether the dis-
covery rule applied. 1 A twenty-six-year-old woman sued her
father after she "remembered" that he had sexually abused her
between the ages of three and eleven.3 2 The statute of limita-
tions expired when the woman was twenty-one." The court
refused to apply the discovery rule, stating that "[p]sychology
and psychiatry are imprecise disciplines. The fact that plain-
tiff asserts she discovered the wrongful acts through psychologi-
cal therapy does not validate their occurrence."" The court
doubted the veracity of the memories, explaining that "[wihile
psychoanalysis is certainly of great assistance in treating an
individual's emotional problems, the trier of fact in legal pro-
ceedings cannot assume that it will produce an accurate account
of events in the individual's past."" The court stated percep-
tively that the purpose of therapy is not to uncover and deter-
mine historical facts, but rather to treat and cure the
patient. 36
127. Id. § 5:31.
128. Gary Hood, Note, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought
by Adult Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 417, 418.
129. See Colanen & Johnson, supra note 115, at 4.
130. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1995).
131. Id. at 226-29 (holding that the statute of limitations would not be tolled be-
cause the plaintiff did not have objective, verifiable evidence of the original act).
132. Id. at 227.
133. The statute stated that the time limit expired three years after the age of
majority or three years after 18 years of age. Id.
134. Id. at 229.
135. Id.
136. Id. The court further declared, "We cannot expect these professions to answer
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Tipping the Balance in Favor of Repressed Memory Plaintiffs
Since Tyson, advocates of repressed memory theory have ar-
gued that statutes of limitations deny victims their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws."3 7 In con-
trast, defendants have argued, to no avail, that the changes in
the statutes of limitations have violated their right to due pro-
cess.' A substantial majority of courts that have addressed
the issue have chosen to toll the statute of limitations when the
plaintiff had completely repressed memories of sexual abuse and
had not remembered until after the statute of limitations ex-
pired."9 A number of states have formally extended their stat-
utes of limitations m repressed memory cases to allow a legal
remedy to alleged victims, and most of these new statutes apply
the discovery rule. 40 For example, in 1990, California amended
its statute of limitations to within three years of the discovery of
questions which they are not intended to address." Id. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals voiced this same skepticism eight years later: "'xpert testimony
might prove the existence of the plaintiffs' subjective beliefs as to the cause of their
distress, but it can give no assurance that those beliefs are grounded mn reality.
Evidence to that effect is of doubtful reliability" Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d
49, 53 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Farris v. Compton, 802 F Supp. 487, 490 (D.D.C. 1992)).
137 See Sargeant, supra note 28, at 12.
138. Id. at 12-13.
139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1369-70 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ev-
ans v Eckehnan, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Lemmerman v.
Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345,
1349 (Utah 1993); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
But see Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 810 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that, under Penn-
sylvama law, the statute of limitations will not be tolled), affd, 950 F.2d 721 (3d
Ci. 1991); Marsha V v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the statute of limitations was not suspended because the plaintiff did
not forget the abuse and only failed to connect the abuse to her emotional distress);
Lmdabury v. Lmdabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that because the clock began to run when either the last incidence of abuse occurred
or the plaintiff reached the age of majority, the plaintiff was barred from bringing
suit). For an rn-depth discussion of the discovery rule in sexual abuse cases, see
Carolyn B. Handler, Note, Civil Clams of Adults Molested as Children: Maturation
of Harm and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709 (1987).
140. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-
202.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (Supp. 1993); ME. REV
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West
Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon Supp. 1995); OR. REV STAT.
§ 12.117 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
12-25.1 (Supp. 1994).
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abuse or the point at which a person should have discovered
that a psychological injury occurring after the age of majority
was the result of sexual abuse, whichever occurred later."
Repressed memory cases thus receive a special status under
many states' statutes of limitations. In essence, tolling the stat-
ute of limitations in these cases effectively eliminates the stat-
ute,' which contradicts the public policies motivating the de-
velopment of statutes of limitations. The statutes exist for
three reasons. First, they provide reasonable notice to defen-
dants of a claim against them, thereby enabling the defendants
to preserve evidence.44 Stale claims present enormous eviden-
tiary problems, and by precluding them, statutes of limitations
increase the chance that factual issues are resolved accurate-
ly 45 Second, statutes of limitations prevent plaintiffs from
"sleeping on their rights" by forcing them to bring actions within
a reasonable period of time.146 Finally, the statutes give peace
of mind to potential tort suit defendants who will not have to
fear forever that a lawsuit may be brought against them. 47
Some courts have found that there are legal protections for
potential defendants despite the changes in the statutes of limi-
.tations. The court in Ernstes v. Warner48 found that the dis-
covery rule provides an objective prong to the subjectivity of
recovered memories by limiting the rule to when a reasonable
person should have discovered the injury '" In Petersen v.
141. Schwestka v. Hocevar, No. C93-2686 SBA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LES 6730, at *3
(NJ). Cal. May 16, 1994) (discussing California's statute of limitations for childhood
sexual abuse). Lapsed claims, however, are not revived by the amendment. Id. at *4.
142. Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 229 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), superseded by
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1995).
143. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 165 (5th ed. 1984). "[Statutes of limitations] are found and approved m all sys-
tems of enlightened 3unsprudence." Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
144. SPEISER, supra note 126, § 5:29.
145. See Farrs v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 58 (D.C. 1994).
146. Hood, supra note 128, at 425.
147. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944) (stating that "the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail
over the right to prosecute them").
148. 860 F Supp. 1338 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
149. Id. at 1341. Ernstes claimed that his high school science teacher molested him
from the ages of thirteen to sixteen. Id. at 1339. He claimed to have repressed the
memories for nearly twenty years until he received counselling for depression. Id.
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Bruen,iS° the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the tradi-
tional three-year statute of limitations for civil suits does not
apply only in those cases in which a plaintiff can show by clear
and convincing evidence that she was sexually abused as a
child. 1 The Supreme Court of Utah has required plaintiffs
who allege repressed memories as a basis for tolling the statute
of limitations to first produce corroborating evidence, such as
evidence of similar acts or evidence of contemporaneous physical
manifestations of the abuse, in support of their allegations.152
The changes in the statutes of limitations are alarming. A
short time period to bring a cause of action may be unfair for a
plaintiff who represses memories of abuse, but it is also unfair
to force a defendant to confront an allegation of abuse that alleg-
edly occurred decades ago.' Witnesses die or become un-
available, memories fade, and tangible evidence disappears over
an extended period of time.' A defendant may have lost ac-
cess to a credible witness who could have provided an alibi or
attested to observing the parties during the time period of the
The court held that because of the nature of the acts and his advanced age at the
time the acts were committed, Ernstes knew or should have known at the time of
the abuse that he was injured. Id. at 1341. The statute of limitations therefore had
not tolled. Id. at 1342.
150. 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990).
151. Id. at 24-25; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1995) (allow-
ing plaintiffs to bring causes of action within two years of the time that they discov-
er or reasonably should discover the abuse, but requiring that actions must be based
on "objective verifiable evidence" such as proof that the plaintiff repressed the mem-
ory and corroboration that the abuse occurred).
152. Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 1993).
153. The Supreme Court has recognized that "statutes of limitations often make it
impossible to enforce what were otherwise perfectly valid claims. But that is their
very purpose " United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
154. See Messina v Bonner, 813 F Supp. 346, 349 (E-D. Pa. 1993) ('precisely be-
cause cases like tis present such serious issues, the fact finder should have the
freshest and most reliable evidence from the maximum number of possible witness-
es"); see also Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 52 (D.C. 1994) (stating that "it is not
easy to defend against allegations of events said to have taken place a great many
years ago"). But see Ann M. Boland, Comment, Civil Remedies for Victims of Child-
hood Sexual Abuse, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 223, 234 (1986) (arguing that "sexually
abused victims should not be barred from pursuing their abusers out of fairness to
the offender"); Hood, supra note 128, at 419 (finding that "the better approach is to
legislatively abolish the statute of limitations as a defense to [child sexual abuse]
civil suits").
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alleged abuse.'
A BASIS FOR THIRD PARTY SUITS AGAINST THERAPISTS
The alarming increase in recovered memory cases guarantees
that there will be a backlash against therapists who use sugges-
tive therapeutic techniques.' Innocent defenders, like Mr.
Ramona, 57 will not tolerate horrible accusations without seek-
mg legal recourse to stop therapists' irresponsible behavior, and,
in light of the success of Ramona, they may seek third party
standing to file malpractice actions against the therapists. A
malpractice action by an injured third party would be the best
course of action from a policy standpoint because it would serve
as a quality control device in the field of psychotherapy Thera-
pists would not be subject to unlimited liability because courts
would judge them by the standard of care that applies to other
mental health professionals.
Ramona was unusual because, traditionally, only a patient
could sue for malpractice based on an injury caused by the negli-
gent acts of a therapist.' Courts have generally not allowed
third party cases on the ground that a health care provider has
no duty of care to a third party."9 In a medical malpractice
155. Farns, 652 A.2d at 58.
156. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 36.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
158. See, e.g., Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, 602 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (de-
scribing a situation xi which a patient treated with sodium pentothal for four years
xi order to encourage the recovery of repressed memories could sue her therapist for
malpractice). In a malpractice action, a patient must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) a relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant ther-
apist xi which the therapist undertook the obligation to treat the plaintiff mi a
nonnegligent manner, (2) a duty of care was breached, (3) a harm resulted from the
breach, and (4) the breach of duty was the cause xi fact and the proxnnate cause of
the injury suffered by the plaintiff. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHE1L,
CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 141-43 (2d ed. 1991). The False
Memory Syndrome Foundation states that between 60% and 70% of the patients
contacting the Foundation who have retracted their allegations have filed lawsuits
against their therapists. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 12, at 8.
159. JOEL I. KLEIN ET AL., LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
3 (1984); see, e.g., Smith v. Pust, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the husband of a woman whose therapist had sex with her while she
was undergoing therapy for repressed memories could not bring a malpractice action
against the therapist because the therapist had no duty of care to the husband),
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case, the plaintiff must prove the establishment of a "relation-
ship in which the ciician undertook [an obligation or duty] to
treat hun in a nonnegligent way,"' 0 and typically, only direct
patients are found to have such a relationship.
Both Ramona' and another recent case, Sullivan v.
Cheshier,ls2 suggest that courts may find third party standing
in malpractice cases involving repressed memories more easily
in the future. As noted previously, in an unprecedented deci-
sion, ' the jury in Ramona decided that the therapists of a re-
pressed memory patient owed a duty of care to the patient's
father, whom she had accused of sexual abuse. The jury award-
ed the father $500,000 for his malpractice claim. ' 4
In Sullvan v. Cheshier, a district judge refused to grant a
therapist a motion for summary judgment on a malpractice
claim brought against him by the parents of one of his pa-
tients.' 5 Kathleen Sullivan "remembered" during hypnosis
that an older sibling sexually abused her when she was
young.' 6 Upon her therapist's suggestion "not to discuss her
memories with anyone who did not accept them,"'67 Kathleen
abruptly broke off all contact with her family 168 Her sibling
not only deied the allegation, but the family uncovered no evi-
dence from their other children, their household staff, or the
children's doctors to corroborate Kathleen's accusations. 69 The
Sullivans contended that Dr. Cheshier suggested the "memories"
modified, No. G012429, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 1356 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1993)
(clarifying earlier opinion as unaffecting any legal rights of the woman). The court
dismissed the defendant's action in spite of the fact that he attended therapy ses-
sions with his wife and subjectively believed that he was the therapist's patient. Id.
at 370. The court found no relationship, in part because the plaintiff did not fill out
a patient questionnaire and did not sign a contract. Id.
160. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 158, at 141.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
162. 846 F Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
163. Hansen, supra note 1, at 36.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
165. Sullivan, 846 F Supp. at 661-62. Sullivan is only the second reported case of
a third party malpractice action against a therapist for suggesting false repressed
memories.
166. Id. at 657
167 Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 657 n.2.
360 [Vol. 37.337
REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME
of the abuse and prevented the family from asking their daugh-
ter about the allegations of abuse. The Sullivans sued the
therapist for malpractice based on the mjury to their family
relationship.' 
7
The court in Sullivan analyzed whether a parent may bring a
malpractice case based on damage to the parent-child relation-
ship."2 In Illinois, parents may bring such cases when their
child dies on account of a health care provider's negligence, but
Illinois law is less clear whether a cause of action will lie when
the child survives. 3 In Dralle v. Ruder, 4 the Supreme
Court of Illinois had previously held that a parent cannot sue for
loss of filial society that occurs as a consequence of malprac-
tice.1" The court in Dralle did not decide whether this rule ap-
plies to acts that intentionally and directly interfere with the
parent-child relationship. 76 In a later case, however, Alber v.
Illinois Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabili-
ties,' 7 the court seemingly resolved the issue when it conclud-
ed that intentional interference was not actionable. 78
In Sullivan, the court noted that other states that prevent
recovery for negligent damage to family ties do permit recovery
for intentional acts. 9 Furthermore, the court found that the
reasons given by Judge Shadur in Dralle for why courts deny
recovery in cases of intentional interference, i.e., "'the availabili-
ty of a tort remedy to the mjured child, the possible multplica-
tion of claims and the difficulty of determining damages, '" 8 °
170. Id. at 657, 662.
171. Id. at 658. The Sullivans also based their action on "the loss of their
daughter's society [and] the intentional and reckless infliction of emotional dis-
tress." Id.
172. Id. at 660-61.
173. Id. at 660.
174. 529 N.E.2d 209 (ll. 1988).
175. Id. at 214-15.
176. Id. at 214.
177. 786 F Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ili. 1992), dismtssed, 816 F Supp. 1298 (N.. Ill.
1993).
178. Id. at 1364-66.
179. See, e.g., Sullivan, 846 F Supp. at 660; Surma v. Lucey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 509,
512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 23 (N.H.
1984).
180. Sullivan, 846 F. Supp. at 660 (quoting Dralle, 529 NE.2d 209, 213 (Ill. 1988)).
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were not present in all intentional interference cases and were
not present in the case at bar.'' The jidge concluded that Illi-
nois law did not preclude intentional interference tort claims by
parents and that a trer of fact could reasonably decide that
there was a genuine issue as to whether Dr. Cheshier was to
blame for destroying the family relationship and implanting
Kathleen's "memories."182 The court also noted that the
Sullivans did not need to prove complete severance of all contact
with the child in order to prove destruction of the family "
Both Ramona and Sullivan suggest that courts may be open
to third party cases against therapists, but neither case has yet
undergone appellate review A sound basis for third party stand-
ing in a repressed memory malpractice case must therefore be
established. Past case law suggests that this may be done by
expanding the number of parties to whom a therapist owes a
duty of care.'84 The following discussion will rely on two lines
of cases to show how courts have expanded a therapist's duty of
care in the past. First, courts have increased the number of
parties to whom doctors owe a duty when a patient threatens
bodily harm to another person. 1" Second, courts have allowed
malpractice cases against therapists who misdiagnose children
as having been abused by the parent. The policy choices made in
these cases may also be applied to repressed memory suits, for
in all three categories of cases the therapist has the ability to
foresee the degree of harm to the third party 186
181. Id. at 660-61.
182. Id. at 661-62.
183. Id. at 661 n.8.
184. KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 53. The author states that the argument in
favor of denying liability because the defendant bears no duty to the plaintiff "begs
the essential question-whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protec-
tion against the defendant's conduct." Id. § 53.
185. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Umv. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc).
186. See Jacqueline Johnson, Comment, A Proposal To Adopt a Professional Judg-
ment Standard of Care in Determining the Duty of a Psychiatrist to Third Persons,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 237, 240 (1991).
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Policy Consideratwns and the Concept of Duty
A brief overview of the notion of duty reveals a flexible con-
cept that has developed m response to social need.' In feudal
society, a person "bore responsibility for any damage he inflicted
without regard to whether he was at fault."' "ce A person thus
owed a duty to all around him." 9 During the Industrial Revo-
lution, this notion of strict liability changed; 90 since then, the
common law has only inposed liability upon the defendant if the
defendant had a specific relationship to the victim.' 9 ' The idea
of "foreseeability" of harm developed to limit the group of people
with whom one had a special relationsip.'92 Over the years,
however, courts have increased the number of cases in which
they impose affirmative duties by expanding the list of special
relationships giving rise to a duty '..
The concept of duty is primarily a policy decision. William
Prosser has defined duty as an "obligation, to which the law will
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard
of conduct toward another."'94  Prosser also argues that:
"[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the
law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection."'95 A
187. HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A
STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW 23 (1987) (stating that the "tendenc[y to expand or
contract liability [is] secreted] within th[e] system's general and mdeterim-
nate concepts and hence flexible structure").
188. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). See generally KEETON
ET AL., supra note 143, §. 53 (discussing the concept of duty).
189. KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 53.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also 2 FOWLER
V HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OP TORTS § 18.2 (1956) (stating that
"[dluty is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably
entails").
193. KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 56.
194. Id. § 53.
195. Id. Lord Esher was the first to try to define the concept of duty:
[Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would
at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his
own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger
of mjury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use
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change in social conditions may thus precipitate a recognition of
new duties.9 ' If policy determines duty,'97 then a public poli-
cy decision to curb overzealous therapists who use radical thera-
pies that cause severe injury would clearly justify the expansion
of the class of parties to whom a therapist owes a duty to in-
clude third parties.9 '
The Tarasoff Cases and the Expansion of Duty
In the past, courts have balanced policy considerations and
expanded the concept of duty in order to increase the number of
relationships in which a therapist owes a duty "' A number of
previous cases are analogous to repressed memory cases because
the injury received by a third party arose from a therapist's
negligence. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
and the cases that followed its precedent, the courts focused on
the foreseeability of harm to a third party
Prosenjit Poddar murdered Tatiana Tarasoff two months after
Poddar confided to a psychologist that he intended to kill
Tatana. °' Tatiana's parents brought suit against the thera-
pist, claiming that he should have warned Tatiana of Poddar's
threats.2 ' The Supreme Court of Califorma agreed with
Tatiana's parents and decided that a climcian has a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect a third party when he or she
knows that a patient represents a danger to that party 2
0 2
The court listed a number of factors that it relied upon in
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
Heaven v Pender, 11 Q.B. 503, 509 (1883).
196. KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 54.
197 Dillon v Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
198. In an analysis of duty, one commentator concludes that no better general
definition of duty can be made "than that the courts will find duty where, m gener-
al, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 143, § 54; see also Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244, 249 (W Va.
1924) (arguing that "[als for public policy, the strongest policy which appeals to us
is the fundamental theory of the common law that for every wrong there should be
a remedy").
199. Tarasoff v Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc).
200. Id. at 339.
201. Id. at 340.
202. Id.
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reaching its decision to expand the concept of a therapist's duty,
including:
the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the mju-
ry suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant, consequences to the community
of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.0 3
Although the court considered all the factors, it found foresee-
ability to be the most inportant policy factor.04
In McIntosh v. Milano, °5 a New Jersey court further ex-
panded the reach of a therapist's duty and held that when a
patient made threats to injure his victim, a therapist had a
general obligation to the community to take action.0 8 The
court found a special relationship in the "broadly based obliga-
tion a practitioner may have to protect the welfare of the com-
munity"" The court analogized the therapist's duty to a
health care practitioner's duty to warn third persons of conta-
gious diseases."' The foreseeability of grave injury to third
parties was the deciding factor in the court's decision.2 9
In 1980, a federal district court, applying Nebraska law,
agreed with the New Jersey decision expanding the concept of
duty In Liparn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,21 a mental patient
receiving treatment at a veteran's hospital withdrew himself
from the hospital's care against his doctor's wishes.21 A month
later, he entered a mghtclub and opened fire with a shotgun into
203. Id. at 342 (citing Merrill v. Buck, 375 P.2d 304, 310 (Cal. 1962) (en bane)).
204. Id.
205. 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
206. Id. at 511-12.
207. Id. at 512.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 497 F Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
211. Id. at, 187.
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the crowded room.212 The court held that the therapist could be
found liable, although he had no knowledge of a specific
threat."3 Rather, a duty existed if the psychiatnst could fore-
see that the patient's violent nature posed a risk of harm to
either a person or a class of persons.2 4 By focusing upon the
foreseeability of a serious injury, the court expanded the number
of persons to whom a therapist owes a duty Likewise, in
Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner,215 a court held a private men-
tal hospital civilly liable for the murder of a woman by her hus-
band, a patient to whom the hospital had granted a day
pass.
216
One need not list all the cases following the Tarasoff prece-
dent. The pattern evident in even this small sampling of the
cases following Tarosoffs precedent reveals that courts have
found that a therapist has a duty to prevent foreseeable injury
to a foreseeable third party The cases on which the following
section will focus use the arguments from Tarasoff to find thera-
pists liable when they misdiagnose a child as sexually abused.
The reasons for finding therapists liable to accused parties when
a young child is misdiagnosed are equally applicable to the mis-
diagnosis of adult children because of the similarity and gravity
of the injury
Malpractice Cases by Third Parties Based on Misdiagnosis of
Sexual Abuse in Young Children
In malpractice cases against therapists for their misdiagnosis
of sexual abuse in young children, courts have granted standing
to parents and foreseeable third parties, allowing them to sue
the therapists in spite of the fact that the parties did not partic-
ipate in the therapy relationship. Repressed memory cases may
be analogized to the misdiagnosis cases because both types of
cases involve serious legal allegations encouraged by the
2i2. Id.
213. Id. at 195. But see Brady v. Hopper, 751 F.2d 329, 331-32 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the therapist who treated John Hinckley, Jr. was not liable for injuries
suffered by the plaintiff, because Hinckley made no specific threats).
214. Lipari, 497 F Supp. at 194-95.
215. 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982).
216. Id. at 694.
366 [Vol. 37.337
REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME
therapist, and the consequences of such allegations are equally
foreseeable, traumatic, and harmful.
In 1988, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Montoya v.
Bebensee,21 reinstated a father's claim against his daughter's
therapist.218 The court faced the question of whether a mental
health provider owed a duty to refrain from taking actions that
would foreseeably result in ijury to another.219 With no physi-
cal evidence of sexual abuse, a therapist, after two perfunctory
visits with the daughter, concluded that the daughter had been
sexually abused. Moreover, without ever meeting with the fa-
ther, the therapist concluded that the father was the abuser." °
In contrast to the therapist's flippant diagnosis, a social worker
told the mother that she was uncertain whether the events de-
scribed by the daughter had ever happened." 1 Another thera-
pist advised the mother that he also entertained serious doubts
about the veracity of the daughter's story 2 Finally, a court-
ordered therapist, who observed the family members both as a
group and individually, did not find the allegations credible.'
As in Tarasoff, the court balanced many policy considerations
before it reached its conclusion that the therapist owed a duty to
the father. The court took into account the great social utility of
requiring therapists to make reports of suspected child abuse,
but recognzed the need to weigh the "significant risk of substan-
tial mjury that may occur to one who is falsely accused of being
a child abuser." 4 The great harm done to one falsely accused
was clearly a foreseeable and unreasonable injury ' By ex-
tending the duty of the therapist "to any person, who is the sub-
ject of any public report or other adverse recommendation by
that provider," no greater burden was placed upon the therapist
than that placed en any other professional."
217. 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 288.
220. Id. at 287.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 288.
225. Id. at 288-89.
226. Id. at 289 (emphasis added). Statutory immunity is generally granted to thera-
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As Ramona illustrates, the California courts have also been
willing to extend a therapist's duty of care to include the
patient's parents. In James W v. Superior Court,' the court
found a therapist guilty of malpractice for pressuring an eight-
year-old girl to accuse her father of sexual abuse." For over a
year, the little girl, Alicia, repeatedly denied that her father had
abused her and stated that a strange man had come through her
bedroom window and attacked her.229 The girl was removed
from her parent's home, and the therapist told her that she
would feel a lot better if she admitted that her father raped
her " Tragically, Alicia was separated from her mother for
one year and her father for two years."i She was almost
adopted by her foster family before the court took steps to re-
unite her with her family " DNA testing eliminated her fa-
ther as a suspect, and the family initiated a suit against the
therapist. 3
The facts of James W may be distinguished from Montoya for
two reasons. First, actual medical evidence proved that Alicia
had been raped and sodomized." 4 Second, the defendant thera-
pist later counselled Alicia., her mother, and her brother, thereby
making one parent a patientY5 Despite these differences, the
court came to an important conclusion about therapeutic rela-
tionships in which the family takes part. The court stated: "The
law recognizes that, where counselors abuse a therapeutic rela-
tionship with family members, causing injury to the children,
emotional distress to the parent, and disrupting the parent-child
relationship, they breach their duties of care to the parent as
pists who report suspected cases of child sexual abuse. In this case, the court found
that the statute did not cover the therapist's conduct because her conduct was outra-
geous and not m good faith. Id. at 289-90.
227 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
228. Id. at 177-78.
229. Id. at 171. The family later discovered that, m the same month, a man living
across the street had abducted a four-year-old girl and attempted to rape her. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 172.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 170.
235. Id. at 172. The mother was so devastated by the accusations of the therapist
that she attempted suicide and was committed to a psychiatric ward. Id.
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well as the children." "
According to James W., the parent may sue the therapist for
malpractice because an implied duty to third parties arises when
the therapist uses the parents as active instruments in the
patient's treatment23' Involving parents in a patient's therapy
is not a new idea. Those therapists who take a family or systems
approach to therapy consider the family to be as much a focus of
the sessions as the prinary patient.' Courts may find a spe-
cial relationship in repressed memory cases because the parents
are considered part of the therapeutic relationship. 9 Thera-
pists often urge patients to confront their parents in order to
begin the process of healing and consider the confrontation pro-
cess a critical step of the therapy 240
In a case of first impression, a New York court, in Caryl S. v.
Child & Adolescent Treatment Services, Inc.,241 extended a
therapist's duty to include individuals not considered to be in-
volved in the therapy relationship.242 The plaintiff, Caryl S.,
was accused by her granddaughter's therapist of sexually abus-
ing the child."' On account of the misdiagnosis, the therapist
recommended that the court limit the paternal grandparents'
236. Id. at 177. The court did not grant the therapist statutory immunity because
she repeatedly coerced Alicia to confess even after any "emergency" had passed and
the authorities had been actively involved m investigating the case. Id.
237. Id. (citing Marlene F v. Affiliated Psychiatnc Medical Climc, Inc., 770 P.2d
278 (Cal. 1989)); see also Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
468, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "an assumed duty may arise from the
utilization of the parents as active instrumentalities in the patient's treatment").
238. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 158, at 7. The authors go so far as to
state that even in matters of patient confidentiality, "[iJamily members are not usu-
ally viewed as third parties by most therapists" but are considered part of the ther-
apy process and should be allowed access to confidential information. Id., see JAY
HALEY, REFLECTIONS ON THERAPY, AND OTHER ESSAYS 95-96 (1981) (analyzing psy-
chopathology in terms of habitual patterns of response between family members and
other intimates).
239. One author and therapist advises that 'the partner, parent or significant other
in the survivors life must be peripherally involved in the treatment." PRENDERGAST,
supra note 74, at 86.
240. See supra notes 21-22, 115 and accompanying text.
241. 614 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
242. Id. at 667.
243. Id. at 663.
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visitation rights.2"
After returning from a visit with her grandmother, Amanda,
age five, told her mother that Caryl had put a stick in her vagi-
na.24 A physician at a local hospital found no physical evi-
dence of abuse, but Amanda's mother, who was divorced from
Amanda's father, filed a petition to preclude contact between
Amanda and her grandmother." The family court granted the
petition, which the grandparents contested. 47 At trial, the
court granted the grandparents unrestricted daytime visits. 248
The judge did not expressly rule whether, based upon a prepon-
derance of the evidence presented at the hearing, Amanda had
been abused by her grandmother 2 49 He did find that the evi-
dence was not sufficient for the hospital to consider filing a
report to the Child Abuse and Maltreatment Hotline as required
by law or for the police to bring criminal chargesY
For the next two years, Amanda underwent counselling with
the defendant therapist, Jones." 1 Jones concluded from her in-
terviews with Amanda that the child had been abused.2 2 The
therapist gave the information to several individuals and recom-
mended to Amanda's family court guardian that she have only
supervised visits with her grandmother until Caryl "exhibit[s]
some responsibility for her actions and obtain[s] some counsel-
ling for whatever emotional problems she may have. '
Caryl and her husband Wallace petitioned the court to recover
damages for injuries suffered by them as a result of the
defendants' acts. 4 They based their claim on three causes of
action. First, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants "negli-
gently, carelessly and recklessly reached the false conclusion
244. Id.
245. Id. at 662.
246. Id.
247 Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 662-63.
250. Id. at 663.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. Jones stated that Caryl's portrayal of events was not credible and that she
had no reason to doubt Amanda. Id.
254. Id. at 662. Both Jones and her employer were named as defendants. Id. at 661.
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that C[aryl] sexually abused A[manda],'" and took action
based on the misdiagnosis." Second, they alleged that the
defendants were not competent to investigate the action. 6 Fi-
nally, in a derivative claim, Amanda's paternal grandfather
alleged that the defendants' negligence resulted in loss of consor-
tium and high medical expenses to treat his wife. 7
The court began its inquiry by examining whether the defen-
dants owed a duty to the plaintiffs." It noted that in recent
years, society had made much progress in exposing child abuse,
but that, at the same time, good faith, but overzealous, efforts to
root out sexual abuse had caused the suffering of many innocent
parents. 9 "[I]t requires little imagination to see the harm [to
the child and the parent] that might result from a negligently
and erroneously formed conclusion with subsequent treat-
ment based on that 'misdiagnosis."' 6
For the first tne, the court had to decide if a therapist owed
a duty to someone, other than a parent, who was outside the
therapy relationship. It concluded that a therapist owes a duty
to one accused, even if outside the therapy relationship, when
the therapist makes a determination of child sexual abuse and
pursues a course of action aimed at shaping the conduct of both
the child and the accused.26' "A suspected abuser . has the
right to a reasonable expectation that such a determination,
touching him or her so profoundly will be carefully made
and will not be reached in a negligent manner."26 In refusing
to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court also noted
that the duty was limited to specifically foreseeable parties. 3
255. Id. at 663.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 664. The court noted that policy plays an important role in the decision.
Id. (citing De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406, 407 (N.Y. 1983)).
259. Id. at 665.
260. Id. at 666. The court declared that the label of abuser is "one of the most
loathsome labels in society" with severe emotional, financial, and physical ramifica-
tions. Id. (quoting Rossignol v. Silvernail, 586 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (N.Y. App. Div
1992) (plaintiff brought defamation action based on statements accusing him of sexu-
ally abusing a child)).
261. Id. at 667.
262. Id. at 666.
263. Id. at 667.
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Conversely, the Texas Supreme Court has rejected the idea
that a therapist might owe a duty of care to a third party In
W.C.W v. Bird,"' the Texas Court of Appeals held that the
harm to a parent from a misdiagnosis that the child was sexual-
ly abused by that parent was a foreseeable mjury for which
damages could be awarded.265 Bird involved a young boy's alle-
gations that "daddy" had sexually abused him.266 The boy was
in the custody of his father after his parents divorced, but when
the father moved to Florida to seek employment, he temporarily
left his son with his former mother-in-law 267 The child later
moved in with his mother and her common-law husband.2"
When the court arranged for the child to join his father in Flori-
da, the mother, claiming her son had reported that "daddy" had
sexually abused him, sought counselling for her son.6 9 The
therapist concluded that the father had abused the son, but
based her conclusions on a ten-minute interview with the
child." The child also told the therapist that "daddy" had
abused him, but the therapist later admitted that she did not
know if "daddy" was the child's biological father or his mother's
common-law husband. A week after the interview with the
boy, the therapist, in spite of her doubts, signed an affidavit
stating that the child had been abused by his biological fa-
ther.272 A court-appointed therapist concluded after lengthier
interviews that the boy had not actually been abused by his
biological father.7
The father sued the first therapist, who had signed the affida-
vit and caused the charges of sexual abuse to be filed, for mal-
practice, charging that she had failed to investigate properly the
allegations of abuse. 4 The appellate court found that the at-
264. 840 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
265. Id. at 55.
266. Id. at 51.
267 Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 52.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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tempted termination of the father's custody rights and the msti-
tution of a criminal action against the father were reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the misdiagnosis. for which the
therapist was liable. 5
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision,
holding that in the case of child sexual abuse, a mental health
professional should be allowed to exercise professional judgment
in diagnosing abuse without the "judicial imposition of a coun-
tervailing duty to third parties."'76 The court explained that,
although the risk of injury from misdiagnosis is almost certain
to occur, there is great social utility in encouraging mental
health professionals to diagnose sexual abuse. 7 It reasoned
that the quality of information that therapists receive is likely to
be poor because young children often have difficulty commum-
catmg information about abuse. 7' Therapists, therefore, would
have a difficult time judging the quality of the information.279
The existence of criminal sanctions against one who knowingly
reports false information in a custody proceeding would lessen
the risk of an erroneous determmation' °
The Texas Supreme Court's decision ignored entirely the fact
that the defendant therapist based her diagnosis on a ten-min-
ute interview The therapist neither asked the child specific
questions nor tested nm,"' and she made the allegation while
she still entertained doubts about the identity of "daddy "2"
The criminal sanction is only applicable to those who knowingly
report false information, not to those who do so negligently
While great social utility arises from allowing therapists to diag-
nose sexual abuse, no social utility can be derived from shielding
therapists who make cavalier judgments that have enormous
275. Id. at 55-56. In a deposition, even the therapist's employer admitted that a
misdiagnosis can cause. "the accused parent emotional trauma, the loss of relation-
slups, and problems with the parent's employment." Id. at 56.
276. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994).
277. Id. at 769-70.
278. Id. at 769.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. W.C.W. v. Bird, 840 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. Ct. App. i992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 767
(Tex. 1994).
282. Id.
1995] 373
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
detrimental effects on the lives of the accused and his family
Therapists will continue to make such negligent diagnoses while
they are protected by court decisions such as Bird.
The Bird decision failed to consider the nature of the
therapist's diagnosis, and instead applied a blanket protection
from liability because it focused on the utility of diagnosing
sexual abuse. The courts in Montoya, James W., and Wallace
followed the better approach, because they considered the great
social benefit of uncovering sexual abuse while, at the same
time, realizing that therapists should not be allowed to "discov-
er" abuse by jumping to conclusions. These cases demonstrate
the willingness of the courts to expand a therapist's duty to
include those parties foreseeably harmed by a therapist's actions
upon a misdiagnosis of sexual abuse. The same arguments may
be applied convincingly to repressed memory cases in which the
danger of misdiagnosis is even greater. Not only are the accusa-
tions based on suggestive techiques, but the memories "re-
trieved" are tarnished by the passage of tune.
PREVENTING UNLIMITED THERAPIST LIABILITY
Therapists' Concerns
Expanding the duty of a repressed memory therapist to in-
clude a foreseeable injured third party does not translate into
unlimited liability for all therapists. After the jury decision in
Ramona, mental health professionals expressed concern that the
expansion of a therapist's duty to include third parties would
become unlimited in scope and would have a chilling effect on
the profession.' The Executive Director of the California As-
sociation of Marriage and Family Therapists remarked that if
therapists "have to satisfy every member of the extended family
or risk being sued, it kind of opens a hornet's nest" 4 of unlim-
ited liability Therapists expressed similar concerns after the
court's decision in Tarasoff As the court in Dillon v.
283. Hansen, supra note 1, at 36.
284. Milo Geyelin, Lawsuits over False Memorzes Face Hurdles, WALL ST. J., May
17, 1994, at B1.
285. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Umv. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 358 (Cal.
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Legg 6 argued when it chose to expand the circle of foreseeable
victims of emotional distress, history has previously exposed the
fallacy that unlimited liability would result from any expansion
of the concept of duty "
Repressed memory therapists might argue that they cannot
reasonably fulfill a duty of care to a third party Again, thera-
pists raised similar concerns after Tarasoff, arguing that they
were unable to predict accurately the future dangerousness of a
patient and thus could not reasonably fulfill the duty " In ad-
dition, the harm from the duty to protect outweighed any benefit
because patients who know that a therapist may reveal a confi-
dence may avoid seeking help. 9
Limiting Factors
The aforementioned concerns, though important, had little
impact on the Califorma court in Tarasoff The court argued
that the duty is reasonable m light of the fact that the standard
of care is limited to that of other mental health profession-
als. 9 Therapists are not held to an impossible standard, and
only those who rely on radical and bizarre therapies would be
liable for injuries resulting from their methods.
The standard of mental health professionals is not exact and
may vary with the school of thought. Many techmques of psycho-
1976) (en banc) (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[o]verwhelmmg policy consider-
ations weigh against imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim
against harm"); Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists To
Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976) (asserting that the negative effects
outweigh the benefits).
286. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
287 Id. at 922 (holding that a mother who witnessed her daughter being run over
by a car could recover damages for emotional distress).
288. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 158, at 149. One academic has retorted
that therapists may not have the ability to predict dangerousness or even to diag-
nose psychiatrc ailments m general, but they have acted as if they are able to do
so, and thereto lies the root of a therapist's negligence. Howard Gurevitz, Tarasoff:
Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 289, 291 (1977).
289. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 158, at 149.
290. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Umv. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc); see also White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (inquiring
whether "[the defendant's] handling of [the therapy] was consistent with the stan-
dards of her profession").
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therapy exist, and they have diverged far from the original ana-
lytically oriented model."' Professional consensus about what
constitutes an adequate standard of care is difficult to obtain
because of the numerous methods and theories. " Courts may
therefore define "customary practice" to mean a generally ac-
cepted standard, or they may choose to lower the standard to
mean that a sufficient "respectable minority" supports the use of
the theory under the same circumstances.293 If the therapy is
extremely unconventional and experimental, like many re-
pressed memory techniques,294 it may even fall outside the
practice of a "respectable minority "295 Parties may introduce
expert testimony to attest to the standard of care and whether
the techniques to retrieve repressed memories are deemed
radical or reliable and generally accepted by the psychiatric
community
The approval of the mental health community would lend
legitimacy to a technique and would bolster an argument that
the recovered memories were not suggested by the therapist, al-
though the converse is also true. Another way to judge the reli-
ability of a repressed memory technique and hence, the liability
of the therapist, is for a court to apply the standards formulated
by the Court in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.296 In Ault v. Jasko,297 Judge Wright analogized repressed
memory techniques to polygraphy and argued that courts should
treat both with the same skepticism and critical examination be-
cause both place enormous responsibility on the questioner to
remain objective.298 He suggested that the criteria that the Su-
291. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 158, at 146.
292. See id.
293. Id. at 146-47.
294. Warnings by both the AMA and the American Psychiatric Association suggest
that repressed memory theory is unconventional and dangerous. See supra notes 62-
63 and accompanying text.
295. See generally JOYCE H. VESPER & GREGORY W BROK, ETHICS, LEGALITIES,
AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE ISSUES IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY 94-98 (1991)
(providing a checklist for a therapist to follow in order to avoid being sued for mal-
practice and warning therapists not to practice beyond their level of expertise).
296. 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98 (1993).
297 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994).
298. Id. at 877 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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preme Court established in Daubert might provide a standard to
judge reliability of the techniques.299 In Daubert, the Supreme
Court established criteria that scientific evidence must meet in
order to be admissible in federal court.30° A court must look at
(1) the falsiflability of the data from the technique, (2) whether
the technique has been published and undergone peer review,
(3) the error rate of the technique, and (4) the general accep-
tance of the technique. 1 The focus of the test is both on the
principles espoused by the technique and the methodology used
to suppport those principles.0 2
The Daubert criteria, in combination with generally accepted
standards of mental health care, would establish reasonable
guidelines for a court to analyze the reliability of repressed
memory techniques. The use of a method that generally fits the
Daubert guidelines could make it more probable than not that
the recovered memory was true because the ability of the thera-
pist to suggest or implant memories would be reduced by the use
of a more standardized and scientifically established technique.
Courts also require guidelines in the field of forensic hypnosis,
which, like polygraphy and repressed memory therapy, provides
many opportunities for the questioner to suggest unconsciously
to a subject a "correct" answer."3 Questioners now follow strict
guidelines in order to ensure that the questioner has not sug-
gested the responses of the hypnotized subject. The guidelines
require a questioner to keep complete and accurate records of
the sessions, beginning with the initial meeting; to inform the
subject of the ramifications of the therapy and to require them
to sign a consent form; and to keep a history of the session by
videotaping or audiotaping the sessions for later referral in or-
der to determine any basis for suggestion.' 4 These guidelines
299. Id.
300. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2796.
303. SCIEFLIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 5. The introduction of hypnotism into
the courtroom has forced judges to answer questions such as: who may practice
hypnotism, who may qualify as an expert, and whether a previously hypnotized wit-
ness may testify in court. Id.
304. Id. at 15-16.
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could also be employed in repressed memory therapy to estab-
lish a baseline for the appropriate standard of care.
Evidence of injury is another limit to liability In malpractice
actions brought by patients against therapists, evidence of an ac-
tual injury is sometimes difficult to establish because the injury
may not be physical or tangible. °5 Pinpointing a therapist's ac-
tions as the cause of that injury may be even more difficult.316
The directive therapy of repressed memory techniques, in which
the therapists urge patients to take specific actions, makes the
injury and the proxinate cause connection easier to find,
however 3°. The injury to the family that results from the
therapist's directions is clearly evident both in the cessation of
the childlpatient's contact with the family and the economic,
reputational, and emotional harm to the innocent defendant. °8
Even if the case is dismissed, the injury to the innocent
defendant's reputation may well linger. The court in Messina v.
Bonner,°9 which granted the defendant's motion to dismiss,
still questioned the father's demal of the abuse and asked
whether his refutation was the result of age or psychological
denial.
CONCLUSION
The trend in psychotherapy to uncover repressed memories
of sexual abuse is a "widespread and damaging" fad.31
Overzealous therapists who focus on recovering memories have
ignored reliable research that such memories are most likely
false3 . and have, instead, encouraged, either directly or mdi-
305. See RONALD J. COHEN & WILLIAM E. MARIANO, LEGAL GUIDEBOOK IN MENTAL
HEALTH 208 (1982).
306. CLIFFORD D. STROMBERG ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGISTS LEGAL HANDBOOK § 8.01,
at 436 (1988).
307 Id. § 8.02, at 444.
308. See supra notes 1-12, 156-71 and accompanying text.
309. 813 F Supp. 346, 351 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
310. OFSHE & WATERS, supra note 18, at 5. A lawyer and psychologist who repre-
sents former patients in cases against their therapists characterized the technique of
recovering memories as the latest of "'bizarre pseudo-psychotherapeutic fads.'" Han-
sen, supra note 1, at 36.
311. OFSHE & WAITERS, supra note 18, at 10; see supra text accompanying notes 1-
113. Women's rights organizations have argued that the suggestion that recovered
378 [Vol. 37.337
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rectly, their patients to file lawsuits against the alleged abus-
ers. States and courts have reacted by tolling or increasing the
statutes of limitations to allow alleged victims their day in
court should the memories be true. Courts should check the
rapid increase in the number of repressed memory civil cases
by expanding the duty of a therapist to include foreseeable
injured third parties. The threat of a malpractice case by an
innocent third party would then act as a quality control device
in the field of psychotherapy. Recovered memory therapists
would be deterred from issuing cavalier diagnoses of prior
sexual abuse and encouraging patients to act on memories
that, if incorrect, could have severely damaging and potentially
irreversible consequences."
Sheila F Rock
memories of abuse are false is evidence of a backlash against female victims of
sexual abuse who have finally spoken out against their abusers. Loftus &
Rosenwald, supra note 4, at 73. Judith Herman, who has written extensively about
incest, argues that questioning the validity of the memories reflects "19th century
Freudian notions of women as so suggestible and unreliable that they concoct fanta-
sies of abuse " Sandra G. Boodman, The Professional Debate over an Emotional
Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1994, at Z13. These arguments fail to recognize that by
ignoring the fact that recovered memories tend to be false, society only further vic-
timizes women. Outrage should be focused instead on the therapists who take ad-
vantage of a female patient's vulnerability. See generally JANE M. USSHER, WOMEN'S
MADNESS: MISOGYNY OR MENTAL ILLNESS? (1991) (arguing that some forms of thera-
py are mind rape). Some commentators have described therapists who practice recov-
ered memory techniques as a new class of sexual predator that encourages female
patients to relive the alleged abuse. OFSHE & WATrERS, supra note 18, at 7.
312. See generally VESPER & BROCK, supra note 295, at 98 (warning that "[tlherapy
is no longer just talk"); Reich, supra note 78, at 82 (providing a discussion of the
difficulty and danger of psychiatric diagnosis).
